ON SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
*

**

Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas P. Stabile

It is an honor to publish with such a distinguished panel at the
American Constitution Society’s annual conference on the subject of
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. We
agree with the panelists before us who have described the adoption of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as being a
Second Founding of the Republic. The Reconstruction Amendments
fundamentally transformed our constitutional structure. One cannot
begin to understand or appreciate American constitutional law without a theory of what happened during Reconstruction.
We have not previously written about Section 5 of the Fourteenth
1
Amendment, so we will offer here only some preliminary thoughts
on that subject which we are open to revising if others show us to be
wrong. Our thoughts on this are still tentative, especially because we
find ourselves in disagreement with both a number of key Supreme
Court decisions in this area and with some scholars who have studied
the question for longer and in more detail than we have. With those
caveats, we would like to make six points about Section 5 inspired by
our reflections on the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores, where the Court struck down Congress’s effort to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment by passing the Religious Freedom Restora2
3
tion Act (“RFRA”). That Act, of course, sought to displace the Supreme Court’s decision on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause as it
4
applied to the States in Employment Division v. Smith. Our thoughts
on this grow out of Judge Michael McConnell’s provocative essay cri-
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George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University. Professor Calabresi’s ideas on this topic have benefitted over the years from many conversations with
John Harrison, Gary Lawson, and Tom Merrill—none of whom are to blame for what we
say here.
J.D. candidate 2009, Northwestern University.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2000).
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that states may prohibit sacramental peyote use).
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We will address briefly

I.
The first point we want to make about the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Boerne is that we agree with McConnell that the Supreme Court’s opinion is overly judge-centric and is wrong in so far
as it seems to suggest that Congress cannot interpret and enforce the
6
Constitution equally with the Court. Our Constitution is unique
among modern constitutions in that it does not empower a particular
entity to interpret and enforce it. In this respect, the U.S. Constitution differs from, for example, the German Constitution, because it
does not contain a judicial review clause assigning the power to en7
force it to a Constitutional Court. The power of judicial review is instead deduced, as every first year law student learns in Marbury v.
8
Madison, by a structural inference from the fact that the Supreme
Court has the power to decide cases or controversies, that it has the
obligation to decide them faithfully to the law, and that the Constitution is higher law than is a statute. From all these facts, Chief Justice
Marshall quite rightly concluded that when the Court is deciding a
case or controversy, it has the power and the duty to interpret the
9
Constitution.
Marshall’s argument defends judicial review, but it does so on
grounds that make it clear that the political branches of government
10
also have the power and duty to enforce the Constitution. After all,
Congress has the legislative power, just as the Court has the power to
decide cases or controversies. When Congress is legislating, we think
it clear that it has the power and duty to interpret the Constitution.
Early in American history, Congress often debated and decided constitutional issues, as David Currie has shown in a splendid series of
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See Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores,
111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
See id. at 155–57.
“The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule . . . on the interpretation of this Basic Law in
the event of disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of a supreme federal
body or of other parties vested with rights of their own by this Basic Law or by the rules of
procedure of a supreme federal body.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [CONSTITUTION] art. 93, § 1
(F.R.G.).
5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 173–80.
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books. Congress played the same role during Reconstruction, the
13
14
New Deal, and the Great Society as well. Nothing in the text of the
Constitution suggests that its interpretation is more the business of
the Supreme Court than it is of Congress. And, while our practice
has been to let the Court take the lead in this area, we have also long
recognized that Congress and the President have a legitimate role to
15
play as well. Text and practice suggest that Congress, like the Court,
has both the power and the duty to interpret and to enforce the Constitution. Any implication to the contrary in City of Boerne v. Flores and
its progeny is just plain wrong.
Judge McConnell is thus right when he says that the opinion in
that case falsely posited a dichotomy between Congress having the
power to change the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution,
as opposed to Congress having only a power to create remedies to en16
force Section 1. There is an intermediate option that the Boerne
Court does not discuss: Congress has the power to interpret Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is legislating to enforce it
under Section 5. Congress’s power to interpret Section 1 is not a
power to rewrite it to mean anything it wants. But neither is it only a
power to provide remedies for violations that the Court has already
identified. Section 5 allows Congress to enforce Section 1 rights before the Supreme Court has identified them, so long as at the end of
the day, the Court agrees that the rights in question are encompassed
in the meaning of Section 1.
We thus agree in part with Michael Kent Curtis when he says that
in the American tradition, the legislature is to some degree a guard17
ian of our liberties. We think this is true, especially with respect to
11
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See, e.g., DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801 (1999) (concluding that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged
not so much in the courts as in the legislative and executive branches).
See Michael Kent Curtis, Congressional Enforcement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendment & the State Action Syllogism: An Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381
(2009).
See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941).
See, e.g., S. REP. NO 88-872 (1964) (debating the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); H.R. REP. NO 88-914 (1963) (debating the same); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–78 (1964) (holding that Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even if the Court in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), held the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
See WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
(The Federalist Society ed. 1992).
See McConnell, supra note 5, at 163–65.
Curtis, supra note 12.
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Congress. More than twenty-five years ago, Professor Calabresi wrote
his student note on how James Madison’s Federalist Ten had turned
out to be right in that the Congress of our extended federal republic
has had a much better track record on civil liberties than have the
18
state legislatures. That assertion is still true today. A legislature in
an extended republic is inherently more likely to protect minority
factions and civil rights than are state legislatures. For that reason,
the Supreme Court ought to review the work product of Congress
with more deference than it accords to the work product of state legislatures.
II.
This leads to our second point about Boerne and RFRA, regarding
the degree of deference the Supreme Court ought to give to Congress in Section 5 cases. Judge McConnell argues for quite a bit of
19
deference. He analogizes the Section 5 context to Chevron and says
20
we ought to give as much deference here as we do there. At times,
Judge McConnell comes close to saying that the Supreme Court
21
ought to use a Thayerian rule of clear mistake in Section 5 cases:
only striking down Acts of Congress that are plainly, palpably, and in
every respect unconstitutional as violations of Section 5. Judge
McConnell thinks it is important to defend a congressional power to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as being different from a power substantively to alter the Constitution, because he justifiably believes there are a lot of hard questions in constitutional law as to
which reasonable people could come down in different ways. He
thinks that as to those questions the Supreme Court ought to defer,
Chevron-style, to any reasonable interpretation Congress might choose
22
to enact.
We disagree with Judge McConnell that the standard for Supreme
Court invalidation of Section 5 legislation is a kind of “beyond a rea23
sonable doubt” standard. There is no textual warrant for that stan-
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Steven G. Calabresi, Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91
YALE L. J. 1403 (1982).
See e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 173, 184–89.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (articulating a doctrine granting deference to administrative agencies in interpreting their own
statutory mandates).
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129 (1893).
See McConnell, supra note 5, at 184–89.
McConnell, supra note 5, at 185–88.
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dard. The text gives Congress the power “to enforce” the rights created by Section 1 by adopting “appropriate” legislation. It does not
say that the Supreme Court must defer to Congress’s interpretations
of Section 1 when deciding cases or controversies unless it thinks
Congress is wrong beyond a reasonable doubt. The congressional
supremacy view of Section 5 is just as wrong as is the judicial suprem24
acy view taken by Justice Kennedy in Boerne. The Supreme Court has
the power and the duty to decide cases and controversies agreeably to
the Constitution. It must make its own independent evaluation of
whether a law “enforces” or changes the meaning of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In making an independent evaluation on this question, the Court
ought to accord congressional statutes a presumption of constitutionality because our Constitution is enforced by a three branch
process of checks and balances. By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, two of the three branches charged with enforcing the
Constitution, indeed sworn by oath to do so, will have made a decision that the action in question is permissible. The Court thus ought
to presume that congressional enactments are constitutional unless a
preponderance of the evidence suggests they are not.
As a practical matter, there are two distinct ways in which Section
5 legislation could be said to be unconstitutional under the text of
Section 5, and the Court ought to follow different paths in those two
different textual contexts. First, Section 5 legislation could be challenged on the ground that it does not really “enforce” Section 1 but
rather redefines it, either by eliminating rights that Section 1 in fact
protects or by adding new rights that go beyond what Section 1 provides. This question of whether a congressional enactment “enforces” rights actually in Section 1 or whether it “changes” them is
one the Court is perfectly positioned to decide using a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Supreme Court has—for good or
for ill—been the preeminent interpreter of Section 1 for the last 140
years, and it has both the right and the duty to form its own independent views on whether a law enforces Section 1 or goes beyond it.
Judge McConnell makes a provocative argument as to why the Court
ought to defer here to Congress, but we think his view is contrary to
140 years of practice.
There is, however, a second question that may arise in Section 5
cases: is a particular law “appropriate” as a remedy for a Section 1 violation? The question of appropriateness is one of degree, and here

24

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525–29 (1997).
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more deference to Congress with its greater fact-finding resources
both makes a lot of sense and seems contemplated by the text. Reasonable people can disagree on what remedies are “appropriate” to
address particular rights violations. Holding hearings and gathering
evidence are indispensible here, and it is also reasonable to conclude
that the constitutional text delegates the question of degrees of “appropriateness” to Congress to decide. On the appropriateness question, we would apply something like Chevron deference. So long as
the law really “enforces” Section 1, rather than changing it, Congress
ought to have wide latitude in choosing among enforcement remedies.
Advocates of congressional power under Section 5 point out that
those who ratified it analogized congressional power in this context
25
to congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The questions of what is “appropriate” and what is “proper” or “necessary” in the sense of “convenient to” or “useful to” seem to be the
26
same. Thus, it is often claimed that Congress ought to get as much
deference when legislating under Section 5 as it gets when legislating
under the Necessary and Proper Clause as construed in McCulloch v.
Maryland. Several proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Congress clearly said as much. Unless Congress is using a pretext to
justify Section 5 legislation, as pretext is discussed in McCulloch, Congress ought to have its way in the Supreme Court.
There is a difference, however, between Congress’s power under
Section 5 and its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause as
discussed in McCulloch v. Maryland. Section 5 legislation must not only be “appropriate”; it must also be legislation “to enforce” Section 1.
The Necessary and Proper Clause contains a similar but never discussed constraint giving Congress the power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper “for carrying into execution” the foregoing enumerated powers. Marshall did not construe this language
in McCulloch. Instead, the case turned primarily on the meaning of
the word “necessary”, and secondarily on the deference Congress
27
should receive as to what was “proper.” But McCulloch never addressed the meaning of the verb “to enforce” because those words
25

26
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See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5; Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109
YALE L. J. 115 (1999).
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (1 Cranch) U.S. 316, 411–15 (1819).
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were not present in the Necessary and Proper Clause just as it did not
address the requirement that laws enacted under the Necessary and
Proper Clause “carry into execution” the enumerated powers. Perhaps the Court overlooked this language.
In any event, McCulloch was not followed. Andrew Jackson re28
jected it and successfully killed the Bank of the United States until
Woodrow Wilson became president. His successors took a similarly
narrow view on issues like congressional power to make internal improvements and therefore on the scope of the Necessary and Proper
29
Clause. Thus, even if the Section 5 power is as broad as congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is not clear
that there was widespread agreement in the years between McCulloch
and 1868 that Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause
30
was correct. There was certainly no agreement on whether Marshall
had been right about the meaning of words like to “carry into execution” or to “enforce” since Marshall never even addressed this issue.
As the Boerne Court realized, the verb “to enforce” is at the very
31
heart of the Section 5 power, and it is for that reason we think that
Court got the Section 5 issue essentially right. (Though, as we shall
presently explain, we disagree with the Court as to the Free Exercise
Clause.) What was the original public meaning of “to enforce” in
1868? Consider the following definitions offered in Noah Webster’s
1828 authoritative edition of the English language: “1. To give
strength to; to strengthen; to invigorate. . . . 6. To compel; to constrain; to force; 7. To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as to
32
enforce the laws.” It is clear from these that the power “to enforce”
Section 1 is not a power “to rewrite it.” This sense is confirmed in The
Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology where enforce is said to come from the
33
Latin roots “in” meaning “make” and “fortis” meaning strong. To
enforce something is thus literally to make it stronger, not to change
its meaning!

28
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Veto Message of July 10, 1832, 3 COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS PRES. 1139 (1897).
See, e.g., PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 193–200 (1987) (noting
President Polk’s opposition to internal improvement bills); J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 112 n.135, 123–24 (2005) (noting
President Tyler’s veto of internal improvement bills).
See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 292–97 (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 1997) (1997) (explaining congressional impact on American expansion in the
mid-nineteenth century).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–20 (1997).
Noah Webster, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (Robert Barhnart ed. 1988).
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It is for this reason that we agree with Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, in so far as it criticizes Justice Brennan’s major34
ity opinion in that case and the ratchet theory of footnote ten. You
do not enforce or make stronger Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment by changing its meaning. The correctness of City of
Boerne v. Flores thus depends on whether RFRA was a law that enforced the Free Exercise Clause as incorporated by Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because Employment Division v. Smith was
wrongly decided.
But, it might be objected that the weight we give to original public
meaning of the verb “to enforce” is not supported by the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to above, which approvingly cites Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch; however, that opinion
never discusses the words “to enforce,” and in any event, we agree
with Justice Scalia in believing that it is the original public meaning of
the text which ought to count in constitutional interpretation. It is
the text which was presented to the States and through them, the
people for ratification, and it is the words of the text that are supreme law. The people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
never had a chance to debate or amend or vote up and down on the
legislative history and probably did not know what it said. Thus, it is
the original public meaning of the text of Section 5 which controls
and not the legislative history.
III.
The third main point we want to make in this essay is that Congress does have the power to enforce the individual rights protected
in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as Michael Kent Curtis
35
argues on this panel. Simply put, we think the Privileges or Immunities Clause does protect the individual rights in the Bill of Rights
from state abridgment, as well as those unenumerated individual
rights described as being privileges or immunities by Justice Bushrod
36
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell. Such unenumerated rights are, as
Professor Calabresi argued in the Michigan Law Review and the Ohio
State Law Journal, rights that are deeply rooted in American history
and tradition and that can be overcome by the police power when the

34
35
36

384 U.S. 641, 660–61, 665–71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Curtis, supra note 12.
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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State enacts general laws for the good of the whole people. As we
just indicated, we think individual rights are protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than by substantive due process as
the Supreme Court has held, but either way Congress plainly has
power “to enforce” individual rights by enacting “appropriate” legislation under Section 5. We do not see how this question could be answered in any other way. There is no principled way in which the Supreme Court could say that something is a right for Section 1
purposes, but Congress lacks power to enforce it under Section 5.
Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce Section 1. Section 1,
either through the Privileges or Immunities Clause or through substantive due process, creates individual rights. It follows a fortiori that
Congress has the power to enforce or make stronger the rights protected by Section 1.
This, at long last, raises the question of whether Section 1 protects
the free exercise of religion, not only from laws that on their face discriminate on the basis of religion, but also from laws that disparately
burden religious groups even though those laws are neutral on their
face. The historic preservation law at issue in Boerne, which was preventing the church there from building an addition, did not on its
face discriminate on the basis of religion, but it certainly did burden
the church by preventing it from expanding. Are such facially neutral burdensome laws violations of the Free Exercise Clause?
To answer that question, one must ask what the plain language of
the Free Exercise Clause protects. It protects more than freedom of
conscience or religious belief, because it protects the free exercise of
religion. It does not protect religion per se, which might be a forbidden establishment, instead and to emphasize again, it protects the
“exercise” of religion. What is the “exercise” of religion? The word
clearly and self-evidently includes some action as well as belief. Sarah
Agudo and Professor Calabresi note in an article forthcoming in the
Texas Law Review that almost all of the State free exercise clauses in
1868, thirty-five out of thirty-seven, protected “freedom of worship”
38
rather than the free exercise of religion. This may indicate that the
Free Exercise Clause would likely have been understood as a protec-

37

Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance
on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).

38

Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 1868:
What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008).
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tion for freedom of religious worship in 1868, when the Privileges or
Immunities Clause became supreme law.
This is interesting because one can imagine a range of religious
freedoms that the Free Exercise Clause might protect. At its narrowest, the Clause would protect freedom of conscience or belief. A
slightly broader reading would protect freedom to profess one’s faith
in private. Slightly broader than that would be freedom to hold religious ceremonies of worship in private with other people. Broader
yet again would be a freedom to profess one’s faith publicly, to worship publicly, and to proselytize—perhaps as persistently as Jehovah’s
Witnesses are wont to do. Broader still would be a freedom to raise
and to educate, or not to educate, one’s children in one’s faith. And
finally, perhaps the broadest understanding of free exercise is the
one encompassed in RFRA itself, which protects all action from facially neutral government laws that disparately burden religious belief
and that are not supported by a compelling governmental interest.
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause understood the free exercise of religion as encompassing freedom of worship, how broad is that freedom? Is the religious freedom encompassed by RFRA a freedom of worship? It
seems pretty clear to us that RFRA goes somewhat beyond what we
39
would ordinarily describe as the protection of “worship.” But that is
not necessarily fatal to the law because three-quarters of the States in
1868, in addition to protecting freedom of worship, also protected ei40
ther unenumerated “natural and inalienable” rights to “liberty” or
recognized that the enumeration in state constitutions of certain
rights should not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people. One minimal way to give force to these “baby” Ninth
41
Amendments and “natural and inalienable” rights clauses in an Article V three-quarters consensus of the States is to read enumerated
rights—like freedom of worship—broadly. Arguably that is all that
RFRA does. In any event, the activity at issue in City of Boerne v. Flores
was directly related to the freedom of worship because the church
sought to add onto its building to accommodate a growing congrega42
tion for ceremonies of worship. Freedom of worship was thus absolutely central to the Boerne case. Freedom of worship was also central

39
40
41

42

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2)–2000bb(a)(3) (2000).
Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 38, at 66–67.
John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993) (arguing that
the Ninth Amendment is the most dynamic and open-ended of all the Constitutional
amendments); Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 38, at 87–90.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511–12 (1997).
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to the Smith case, because in that case, Native Americans were denied
43
the right to ingest controlled substances in a ceremony of worship.
The argument for the Government in Boerne and Smith is that the
historic preservation and drug laws in question did not on their face
prohibit freedom of worship. Thus, they do not violate the Free Ex44
ercise Clause for the reasons Justice Scalia explained in Smith. Our
difficulty with this, however, is that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects rights absolutely from “abridgment,” whether the abridgement comes in the form of a facially neutral law or not. The
Constitution protects religious “exercise” or, at a minimum, “worship.” The question for a formalist judge like Scalia is thus simply:
whether a law “abridges”—not discriminates against but “abridges”—
freedom of religious worship. “Abridges” here means “to make
45
shorter” or “to lessen.” In the First Amendment context, laws are
widely recognized “to abridge” freedom of speech or of the press if
46
they are overbroad. Laws that heavily burden core religious worship
and that are not supported by a compelling government interest
would seem to abridge, or make shorter, rights of freedom of worship
at least by being overbroad.
At a minimum, one could say that the question of whether facially
neutral laws with disparate impacts on worship are “abridgments” or
not is a question that goes to the standard of proof. We have appropriately recognized, in the context of racial discrimination, that Congress can legislate a presumption of discrimination or of discriminatory intent from disparate impacts that are unexplained by business
47
necessity. That is all that Congress has done here with RFRA. Congress has fleshed out the concept of abridgements of the freedom to
worship by explaining that they are present where a facially neutral
law that is not justified by a compelling governmental interest bur48
dens an activity that is central to a religious group.
Presumably
Congress has, at a minimum, the remedial power to define how a

43
44
45
46

47

48

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–76 (1990).
Id. at 883–91 (asserting that States are not required to accommodate otherwise illegal acts
done in the pursuit of religious beliefs).
WEBSTER, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“When the statutes also have an
overbroad sweep . . . the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights
may be critical.”).
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that while employment practices of discriminating against employees because of race is unlawful, it is lawful to use a
professionally developed ability test that is not designed or intended to discriminate).
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 5 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993).
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Fourteenth Amendment litigant should go about proving whether or
not there has been an abridgement.
It is absolutely true, as the Court said in Boerne, that there is not in
the Free Exercise area the same sordid history that Americans have
49
endured with respect to race discrimination. Measures that might
be “appropriate” or “proportionate” or “congruent” to eradicating
race discrimination could thus be said to be too broad when Congress is first enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the Bill of Rights.
The difficulty with this argument is that the Boerne Court offers no
reason why Congress cannot legislate prophylactically against new
evils that it anticipates may soon arise.
There is reason for Congress to fear that the big expansion in the
role of government we have seen in the last fifty years may undesirably burden the free exercise or freedom of worship rights of individual citizens. Congress does not need to wait until after this has happened to legislate against it. The Court can point to no textual
source for its conclusion that prophylactic legislation is not congruent and proportional other than its own opinion about what measures are “appropriate” to enforce Section 1. We agree with the court
that the test here is one of congruence and proportionality, but we
think the Court applied the test incorrectly in Boerne. RFRA seems to
us to have been an appropriate remedial measure to define what constitutes an abridgment of the freedom to worship, given the huge
growth we have experienced in the role of government and the impact that might have in the future on the individual right of religious
freedom.
As we said above, the Court ought to be more deferential to Congress on questions on what Section 5 laws are “appropriate” even if it
considers de novo whether those laws “enforce” rights created by Section 1. Boerne is thus mostly right as to Congress’s power under Section 5 but wrong as to Smith and RFRA. Importantly, the Court
reaches the wrong result in the case before it, and it wrongly declares
unconstitutional a major act of Congress. What about Boerne’s progeny striking down federal laws forbidding the States from discriminating against the disabled or the elderly?

49

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (“In contrast to the record of widespread and persisting racial discrimination which confronted Congress and the Judiciary
in those cases, RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of any instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry in the past 40 years”).
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IV.
This leads us to our fourth point: we do not think Congress has
the power under Section 5 to create new suspect classes, be they classifications that burden the disabled, the elderly, or the religious.
Note that it is vital to our argument here that we be correct that Congress can protect the individual rights secured by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, like the right to freedom of worship, because we
do not think RFRA is justifiable on a theory that Congress can make
discrimination on the basis of religion a forbidden classification.
A congressional power to create new suspect classes would go well
beyond enforcing of Section 1 and would venture into the realm of
changing its meaning. Congress could only validly enact such a law if
the Court were to agree with Congress after the fact that, in its own
independent judgment, the creation of the new suspect classification
was a correct one. We agree that Section 1 bans not only racial caste
systems, but all systems of caste or of class-like discrimination. The
fact that the Amendment does not mention the word race, unlike the
Fifteenth Amendment, suggests it does have a broader application.
We think that if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had been
asked whether European medieval feudalism, with its class system of
nobles and serfs, was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment,
they would have said it was not. We likewise think that they would
have thought the Fourteenth Amendment banned the importation of
the Hindu caste system with its division of the people into classes of
Brahmins and Untouchables with different civil rights. We do agree
that the no class-based discrimination rule of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to all systems of caste or of class-based legislation. It is thus possible that new suspect classes beyond race could
come to be recognized, but it does not follow that Congress ought
simply to be able to create them on its own say so.
The most famous extension of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban
50
on class-based laws is its extension to sex discrimination. This extension seems to us to be easily justified notwithstanding all the angst it
has raised over the last forty years. Section 1 is premised on the idea
that all citizens enjoy equal civil rights which it calls “privileges” or
50

See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that parties who seek to
defend gender-based government action demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma’s gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that unequal spousal benefits denied due process rights);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a statutory preference for men over women violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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“immunities.” The Fifteenth Amendment establishes that a subset of
citizens with equal civil rights, which is to say white and AfricanAmerican men, enjoy equal political rights like the right to vote in
51
addition to equal civil rights. Political rights are thus established as
being harder to get than civil rights. After the Reconstruction
Amendments, men, women, and children all have equal civil rights,
but only men have political rights. This remained the status quo for a
52
half century until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.
The Nineteenth Amendment, then, critically alters the legal landscape by giving women equal political rights to men. Is it really plausible, in the wake of the Nineteenth Amendment, to say that women
have equal political rights to men and African Americans but that only race, and not sex, is a suspect classification for discrimination as to
civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment? It seems unlikely. If
it is forbidden “discrimination” under the Nineteenth Amendment to
deny a woman the political right to vote because of her sex, is it not
likely that state action that discriminates on the basis of sex as to civil
rights violates the “no systems of caste” rule of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment? Here it is not the Justices and not Congress that
have recognized sex as a suspect class. It is the American people
themselves . . . in a constitutional amendment, no less! The extension of the Fourteenth Amendment to ban sex discrimination is thus
a logical consequence of the light shed back on the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Nineteenth.
What about other extensions of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond sex discrimination, such as its extension to sexual orientation
53
discrimination in Romer v. Evans or in Justice O’Connor’s concur54
rence in Lawrence v. Texas? As Professor Andrew Koppelman has
pointed out, sexual orientation discrimination may just be a form of
55
sex discrimination. Laws that forbid men who have sex with men
from talking about it while in the military, but which do not impose
51

52
53

54

55

“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment, which precludes all
governmental action designed to protect homosexuals, violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that a law making only
same-sex sodomy illegal was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).

July 2009]

ON SECTION FIVE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

1445

the same ban on men who have sex with women, arguably make a
classification on the basis of sex. On the other hand, it is fair to point
out that sexual orientation discrimination has not been generally understood as being sex discrimination and that gays have won no big
political victory, like the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment,
that would warrant the creation of a new suspect class. In fact, the
matter is the subject of hot debate among the American people, and
so arguably the courts should hold off on recognizing sexual orientation as a suspect class until the American people are at rest on the
subject.
What about suspect class status for the disabled or the elderly?
Can Congress—simply by legislating—declare these two to be forbidden forms of caste-like discrimination? We do not think Congress
can, simply by passing a Section 5 statute, recognize a new suspect
class; only the American people, by consensus over a sustained period
of time, can do that. That process has not yet happened with respect
to the disabled or the elderly, although eventually it may. We therefore think that the Supreme Court was right to say in its Section 5
56
case law that Congress over-reached when it passed these laws.
These were not laws to “enforce” Section 1, but they were laws that
changed its meaning. This is not because Congress identified a violation of Section 1 before the Supreme Court did. That is perfectly
permissible. Congress need not wait for the court to find a suspect
class to legislate to protect it. At the end of the day, however, the
Court in a case or controversy has to be persuaded that Congress was
right that something is a new suspect classification, a decision which
is momentous and far-reaching. We think the Rehnquist Court acted
plausibly in saying that Congress had exceeded its powers when it
found disability or age discrimination to be violations of Section 1 at
least as it stands today. Whether those decisions will stand the test of
time remains to be seen.
V.
This brings us to our fifth point about Congress’s Section 5 power,
which is: what about laws which Congress has passed, like the Vio57
lence Against Women Act, which penalized private violent conduct
against women? The Supreme Court struck down this Act in Morrison

56
57

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (developmentally disabled); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age).
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006).
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58

v. United States by a 5-4 vote. We must say that we are quite skeptical
about Morrison for several reasons. First, there is no doubt in our
minds about Congress’s power to legislate to deal with sex discrimination. We think Section 1 forbids sex discrimination as a form of caste
59
to essentially the same degree as it forbids race discrimination. As
we said above, that is the fair implication of the Nineteenth Amendment.
Second, we think Congress can legislate prophylactically under
Section 5 as we argued above, and we also think there was an enormous amount of evidence on the record in Morrison that violence
against women was and is a huge problem that the States have not
dealt with adequately.
Third, we are not persuaded by the Supreme Court’s view in Mor60
rison that there was no State action in that case. The Court essentially held that because Morrison, the assailant, was a private person
who had attacked Brzonkala, a private victim, and because Virginia
outlawed violence against women as a matter of its formal criminal
61
and tort law, therefore there was no way in which the State of Virginia was violating the no discrimination command of the Equal Pro62
tection Clause. We think the Court just goofed here, because it does
not understand how the language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment works.
We think Section 1 bans discrimination in the making of laws
when it says, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab63
ridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
This Clause does protect individual rights against abridgment, as Mi64
chael Kent Curtis has argued, but it also protects against class-based
systems of law. The word “abridge” is used in the Fifteenth Amendment in an anti-discrimination sense and in the First Amendment in
the sense of burdens on individual rights. Both systems of caste and
58
59

60
61

62
63
64

529 U.S. 598 (2000).
There may, for example, be forms of sex discrimination, like sex segregated bathrooms,
that are unobjectionable but would be objectionable if they were segregated on the basis
of race. Undoubtedly, there are other examples like this but not many. We think Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion in the VMI case is essentially right. See United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that VMI’s categorical exclusion of women violates the Equal
Protection Clause but discussing unobjectionable forms of segregation).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–27.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2004) (rape); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (2004) (aggravated sexual battery); Parsons v. Parker, 170 S.E. 1 (1933) (holding that Virginia law
recognizes the civil action for rape).
See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
Curtis, supra note 12.
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laws depriving individuals of rights are fairly described in the ban on
“abridgments” of privileges or immunities.
If the Privileges or Immunities Clause bans discrimination in the
making of laws, what then does the Equal Protection Clause do?
Here, as in part with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we follow
65
Professor John Harrison’s view. The Equal Protection Clause is a
clause that is about “the Protection” of the laws and not the making
of them. It says in essence that the States must neither discriminate
on the basis of a suspect classification, nor discriminate in “the Protection” of the laws by enforcing facially adequate and neutral laws in
a discriminatory way. It is inadequate to have laws that ban violence
against African Americans or women on the books if those laws go
unenforced. It is quite clear, as Michael Kent Curtis points out in his
essay for this symposium, that the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause saw it as protecting African Americans and white Republicans
from private violence like lynchings and assaults that were going unpunished by the Southern States even though the law on the books
66
forbade them. Congress could and did create supplementary fed67
eral remedies to deal with situations like that.
This is precisely what Congress did in passing the Violence Against
Women Act. Congress was concerned about a well-documented
problem of women being denied “the Protection” of laws against vio68
lence. It responded by creating a supplementary federal remedy for
the private victims of that violence. It is true that the state action
here was inaction in enforcing laws against violence for the benefit of
women, but the States are under an affirmative obligation to provide
women and African Americans with the equal “protection” of the
laws. The American Constitution is, for the most part, a charter of
negative liberties, but it is not exclusively so. The Equal Protection
Clause does impose some enforceable affirmative obligations on the
States. Ironically, the Rehnquist Court missed this point, because its
members were so used to thinking wrongly that the Equal Protection
Clause was the main equality guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment, when in fact the Privileges or Immunities Clause plays that
role, that they missed that the noun in the Equal Protection Clause is

65

66
67
68

John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385 (1992)
(arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is an equality-based protection, as opposed to a substantive protection).
Curtis, supra note 12.
Id.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385–86 (1994) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 39–
55 (1993); S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 33–35, 41, 43–47 (1991).
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“protection” while “equal” is only the adjective. The Equal Protection
Clause is about the affirmative obligation of the States to provide the
“protection” of the laws already on the books. Morrison v. United States
is thus wrongly decided on the Fourteenth Amendment question.
How far does the States’ affirmative obligation go to provide “protection” of the laws? That is a huge subject, which we will not even
attempt addressing here. It suffices to say that the Clause imposes
some affirmative obligations on the States and that state inaction in
living up to those affirmative obligations is state action in violation of
Section 1. Congress can and should legislate as to such state inaction
under Section 5.
VI.
Our sixth and final point raises tentative questions about Michael
Kent Curtis’s provocative paper for this panel insofar as it contends
that Congress can legislate directly on private citizens in its enforce69
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The strongest argument in
our view that Curtis is right is the Citizenship Clause with which Sec70
71
tion 1 begins. As Justice Harlan argued in the Civil Rights Cases,
Section 1 in conferring citizenship on all who are born and natural72
ized in the United States overturned the Dred Scott case. It made African Americans citizens of the United States and gave them equal
civil rights, which are citizens’ rights, with white citizens. The words
“civil” and “citizen” come from the same Latin root and mean the
73
same thing. Dred Scott had explicitly said that a reason why the Court
could not imagine that African Americans were citizens was because if
they were, they would enjoy the civil right or citizens’ right to keep
74
and bear arms! Since the Court could not imagine that to have
been the case, it reached the absurd conclusion that African75
Americans were not citizens. The Citizenship Clause overrules all of
this; it contains no state action requirement, and it is of course enforceable under Section 5. All of this supports Michael Kent Curtis’s
views.

69
70

71
72
73
74
75

Curtis, supra note 12.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27–62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 33, at 174.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
Id.
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The strongest argument against Curtis is that civil rights or citizens’ rights are at least as much a synonym with privileges or immunities as they are derivative of citizenship. Privileges or immunities, or
civil rights, are very explicitly only protected from hostile state action
and not from private action. The use of the “No State shall” lan76
guage, with its echoes in Barron v. Baltimore and in the choice of
77
words in Article I, Section 10, seems very deliberate and calculated,
as “No State shall” is a clear term of art. Thus, the second sentence of
Section 1 fills in any ambiguity about the scope of civil rights of citizens raised by the first sentence by making it clear that privileges or
immunities are only protected from State abridgement and not abridgement by private parties. The specific language of the second
sentence controls the vague, general language of the first. It is for
reasons of this kind that the Supreme Court early on found a state action requirement of some kind to be implicit in Section 1. It is true,
as Curtis points out, that the Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania deduced a
congressional power to reach private conduct from the Fugitive Slave
78
Clause, but that Clause did not use the “Simon-Says” magic words
79
“no State shall.” Those words specifically qualify the privileges or
immunities protected by Section 1 and make clear that they are protected only from state action and not from private action.
We find this to be a genuinely hard question as a matter of figuring out the original understanding—harder in fact than all the very
hard questions raised by the Fourteenth Amendment that we have
discussed so far. Happily, it is a question that practice has settled for
80
us. We do have a state action doctrine, and the Court ought not and
will not reconsider it anytime soon. If Congress were to legislate
against private action in a context not involving the State’s affirmative
obligation to provide the equal “protection” of the laws, then the
Court ought to consider Curtis’s evidence on the original understanding of the text along with subsequent precedent. When Congress legislates based on its understanding of the Constitution, the

76
77
78
79

80

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (discussing the Fifth Amendment).
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–65
(1998).
41 U.S. 539 (1842).
“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
such Service or Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Court cannot simply rest on its precedents, like Employment Division v.
Smith, as a complete response.
81
Congressional initiation of a dialogue with the Supreme Court
about a question of constitutional meaning imposes on the Court an
obligation to do more than just fall back on its precedents. The decision to follow stare decisis is, at bottom, a prudential one in which the
Court concludes that the costs of abandoning a precedent, around
82
which expectations have formed, exceed the benefits to be gained.
This judgment is quintessentially political, and it involves a weighing
83
of incommensurable harms and benefits. Such political questions,
as Judge McConnell notes in his critique of Boerne, are best weighed
84
in Congress. If the democratically elected Congress or President
disagrees with the Supreme Court’s stare decisis cost-benefit analysis
on an issue, the Court ought to drop precedent and answer the question based on its own view of the original meaning of the words in the
constitutional text. Congress cannot, in our view, force the Court to
defer to its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless it is
clearly mistaken, but it can reset the clock and force the Court to revisit the original meaning of a clause unencumbered by judicial case
law. The Court’s failure to do so in Boerne is that decision’s greatest
weakness.
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On the subject of dialogues between the courts and legislatures, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke,
57 ALA. L. REV. 635 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005).
Id.
McConnell, supra note 5, at 156.

